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Prior to the creation of a trust and at its termination, ambiguity may exist in 
regard to the extent of the trustee’s fiduciary duties.  This uncertainty leads to 
litigation1 and a need for clarification as to when fiduciary duties start and end.2  
                                                 
 + Professor of Law, University of Connecticut Law School. 
 1. While this Article deals exclusively with trusts, similar questions may arise regarding the 
administration of estates.  See, e.g., Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to “Non-
Clients”: Reconceptualizing the Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity Representation and Other 
Inherently Ambiguous Situations, 45 S.C. L. REV. 659, 66970 (1994) (discussing the difficulty of 
determining fiduciary duties for disputes in estate law between companies and individuals). 
 2. See, e.g., Greene v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 516 N.E.2d 311, 315 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) 
(finding no fiduciary duty existed between a corporate trustee and the plaintiff in connection with 
a series of trusts because the plaintiff confused the duties of a co-executor and trustee); Melanie B. 
Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67,  
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It is argued that, where fiduciary duties do not exist, contract law may be found 
to govern the rights of the settlor, the trustee,3 and the beneficiaries.4  Under the 
principles of modern contract law, certain conduct may be permitted that would 
not be acceptable if fiduciary duties existed.5 
This Article will discuss three common situations: (1) the seeking of a receipt 
and release by a corporate fiduciary upon an informal termination of a trust; (2) 
the acceptance of terms that a corporate fiduciary requires prior to a settlor 
appointing a corporate fiduciary as a trustee; and (3) the need for a trustee to 
give notice to trust beneficiaries.  At each of these points, clear conflicts can 
arise between principles of contract law and trust law.  This Article suggests that 
a keen awareness of these potential clashes can help achieve fairer agreements 
and better trust administration.  Further, this Article focuses on whether it is 
appropriate to validate contract provisions agreed upon prior to the 
establishment of a trust, or provisions of a trust agreement, when those terms are 
sought by the trustee and possibly suggest that the trustee is overreaching or 
exploitating an advantage. 
Part I of this Article analyzes the historical trajectory of contract law since the 
eighteenth century, and provides a framework through which one can understand 
the preliminary contractarian provisions of a trust.  Part II of this Article explores 
the development of trust law that serves to protect the interests of the trustee, the 
settlor, and the beneficiary.  Part III discusses the legal standing of a corporate 
trustee’s power over a settlor or beneficiary, and describes the latest case law 
determining the scope of a corporate trustee when bargaining the parameters of 
a trust agreement.  Part IV demonstrates the typical standard form agreement 
that settlors can expect when employing a corporate trustee.  Part IV also 
describes the strengths and weaknesses of such an agreement and considers how 
a corporate trustee may attempt to take advantage of a settlor.  Finally, Part V 
illustrates the Uniform Trust Code (UTC)’s provisions regarding the mandatory 
disclosure requirements of a trust.  These provisions indicate that a corporate 
                                                 
9293 (2005) (noting that the ability for corporate trustees to stray from the formal standards of 
fiduciary duties makes “[l]itigation . . . more costly and settlement less likely” (footnote omitted)). 
 3. With respect to imposed fiduciary obligations, “a trustee is held to something stricter than 
the morals of the market place.  Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, 
is then the standard of behavior.”  Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).  
Accordingly, the trustee is required to put the interest of the beneficiary above his own.  This Article 
utilizes the term “trustee” to refer to a corporate fiduciary, but the issues discussed also pertain to 
an individual trustee or co-trustees. 
 4. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law in Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 
65960 (1995). 
 5. Cf. Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 
59596 (1997) (noting that the range and expectations of behavior for a fiduciary varies depending 
on the field and factual situation); Langbein, supra note 4, at 64041 (describing the changing 
powers and behaviors attributable to trustees in light of the change in fiduciary duties and trust 
law). 
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trustee has particular duties to a beneficiary that may alter his relationship and 
duty of loyalty to the original settlor of the trust. 
This Article does not attempt to suggest specific new legal rules that might 
resolve all of the situations in which a clash of doctrines may occur.  Ultimately, 
new rules will likely be developed by statute or court decisions.  As of now, it is 
understandable that courts may respond differently to various factual patterns.  
Awareness of the potential for uncertainty and a clash of doctrines will allow 
corporate fiduciaries acting as trustees to appropriately tailor their actions to be 
consistent with their fiduciary duties, thereby minimizing the need for litigation. 
I.  FAIRNESS AND SOCIAL UTILITY OF CONTRACT LAW 
A.  Fairness and Equitable Theory Dominate Early Contract Law to Protect 
Citizens 
The periods of contract development pertinent to trust administration and 
relevant to this Article took place in the United States and England in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  Contract law dictates that contracts may be void 
if they contain unconscionable terms or were formed while one party was under duress;6 
“[m]uch of the law of contract is concerned with ensuring that agreements are arrived at 
in a way that meets at least minimum standards respecting both parties’ understanding 
of, and freedom to decide whether to enter into, the transactions.”7  Courts determined 
that certain agreements went against public policy, such as agreements to perform civil 
crimes.8  Rules were also formulated to provide protection against self-serving guardians 
for minors and disadvantaged persons.9  Other rules created particularized contract 
requirements to protect against “the assumption of a legally binding obligation to confer 
a gift of money or other gratuitous benefit upon another.”10 
In the eighteenth century, courts would determine whether a breach of contract 
existed based on the principles of equity and fairness before a promise was 
                                                 
 6. See, e.g., JOSEPH M. PERILLO & JOHN D. CALAMARI, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON 
CONTRACTS 31517, 388421 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing the development and impact of duress 
and unconscionability in contract law); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 175(1) (1981) (“If 
a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves the 
victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.”). 
 7. Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Contract, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www. 
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/135270/contract/21771/Fairness-and-social-utility (last updated 
May 6, 2014) (highlighting the element of fairness around which contract law revolves). 
 8. Id.  See Gamble v. Connolly, 943 A.2d 202, 210 (N.J. 2007) (“No contract can be 
sustained if it is inconsistent with the public interest or detrimental to the public good.”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 178 (providing when terms of a contract violate public 
policy and render the contract unenforceable). 
 9. Von Mehren, supra note 7. 
 10. Id. 
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deemed enforceable.11  This approach was common in cases in which one party was 
able to set the terms of a contract without a real chance for bargaining.12  Courts often 
looked to the actual words and documents that created the contract rather than 
what the parties meant by those words and actions.13 
Both the English and American legal systems demonstrated an equitable 
theory that tempered the freedom of contract between parties with principles of 
fairness and justice.14  Where contractual obligations clearly departed in a large 
degree from the ideals of honesty and fairness, the contract would likely not be 
upheld.15  When equitable theory was still the predominant approach, contract 
law in the American colonies commonly applied the rules for exchange of title 
to land.16  The colonial economy was rural, agricultural, and pre-industrial.17  
While trade and commerce were growing, locally based market relations tended 
to be the norm.18  In more remote areas, subsistence agriculture and barter still 
often prevailed.19 
B.  To Meet the Needs of a Changing Society, Judicial Interpretation 
Recharacterizes Adequacy of Consideration 
Beginning in the eighteenth century and continuing into the early nineteenth 
century, an equity court would carefully examine adequacy of consideration.  
For example, Seymour v. Delancey20 involved a contract for the exchange of two 
country farms in New York for a one-third interest in two city lots.21  The action 
for specific performance of the exchange was brought against the descendant of 
the party who was to convey the two farms.22  The case was first heard by 
                                                 
 11. Morton J. Horwitz, Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
917, 92324 (1974) (describing how courts accounted for fairness). 
 12. Id. at 950; see also Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract 
Formation and Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 427, 43031 (2000). 
 13. James Oldham, Reinterpretations of 18th-Century English Contract Theory: The View 
from Lord Mansfield’s Trial Notes, 76 GEO. L.J. 1949, 1958 (1988) (quoting P.S. ATIYAH, THE 
RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 419 (1979)); see also von Mehren, supra note 7 (“[A] 
written agreement may be interpreted against the party who drafts or chooses the language.  Or the court may prefer 
an interpretation it finds to be in accord with the public interest.”). 
 14. Horwitz, supra note 11, at 917, 92324. 
 15. Id. at 923 (“The most direct expression of the eighteenth century theory was the well-
established doctrine that equity courts would refuse the specific enforcement of any contract in 
which they determined that the consideration was inadequate.” (footnote omitted)). 
 16. Id. at 920. 
 17. EDWIN J. PERKINS, THE ECONOMY OF COLONIAL AMERICA 41 (1980). 
 18. See id. at 49 (highlighting the more rapid growth of commercial markets in the north 
compared to the middle and southern colonies). 
 19. Id. at 104. 
 20. 6 Johns. Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1822), rev’d sub nom. Seymour v. Delancy, 3 Cow. 445 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1824). 
 21. Id. at 223. 
 22. Id. 
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Chancellor James Kent.23  According to his interpretation of the “weight of 
testimony,” the two farms were worth $14,000 at the date of the agreement, and 
the one-third interest in the lots was worth $5,000.24 
While the witnesses called for valuation disagreed, Kent stated that “I am 
satisfied, that . . . the village lots were not worth half the value of the country 
farms.”25  Kent proceeded to announce that “[i]t is a settled principle, that 
a specific performance of a contract of sale is not a matter of course, but 
rests entirely in the discretion of the Court, upon a view of all the 
circumstances.”26  “A Court of equity,” Kent went on, “must be satisfied 
that the claim for a deed is fair and just, and reasonable, and the contract 
equal in all its parts, and founded on an adequate consideration, before 
[the court] will interpose with this extraordinary assistance.”27 
After examining a series of English decisions, Kent confessed that in 
the most recent cases of the time “there [was] a doubt thrown over the 
question, whether inadequacy of price alone, though not so great as to be 
evidence of fraud, [would] be sufficient, .  .  .  to withhold the decree for a  
specific performance.”28  Apparently, however, Kent was more struck with the 
preponderance of earlier cases in which no such doubts were raised.  He said: 
There is a very great weight of authority against enforcing a 
contract, where the consideration is so inadequate as to render it 
a hard bargain, and an unequal and an unreasonable bargain; the 
argument is exceedingly strong against it in such cases, when it 
is considered that if equity acts at all, it must act ex vigore,[29] 
and carry the contract into execution, with unmitigated severity: 
Whereas, if the party be sent to law, to submit his case to a jury, 
relief can be afforded in damages, with a moderation agreeable 
to equity and good conscience, and when the claims and 
pretensions of each party can be duly attended to, and be 
admitted to govern the assessment.30 
Kent refused specific performance after observing that, under the civil law 
and comparable foreign laws, judges rescinded contracts for the sale of land if 
                                                 
 23. Seymour, 3 Cow. at 448 (naming Chancellor Kent as the maker of the lower court 
decision). 
 24. Seymour, 6 Johns. Ch. at 22324. 
 25. Id. at 224. 
 26. Id. at 22425. 
 27. Id. at 225. 
 28. Id. at 231. 
 29. Ex vigore refers to ex propio vigore, a Latin term meaning “by its own force.”  Anna Su, 
Speech Beyond Borders: Extraterritoriality and the First Amendment, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1373, 
1398 (2014). 
 30. Seymour, 6 Johns. Ch. at 232. 
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the price was below half the value of the land.31  Kent’s refusal was reversed 
in 1824 in Seymour v. Delancy32 by the New York Court for the Trial of 
Impeachment and the Correction of Errors, a unique New York judicial 
institution that is now extinct, which consisted of the Members of the New 
York Senate, the Chief Judge of the New York Supreme Court, and the 
Equity Chancellor.33 
By the late nineteenth century and thereafter, the country’s expansion and the 
need for progress outweighed concerns for fairness in contract formation.34  
Court interference with deals clearly favoring powerful corporations represented 
by large and powerful law firms disappeared.35  This judicial protection was 
replaced by the contract rule of law that adequacy of consideration will not be 
questioned when there is a bargained-for exchange.36 
Thus, contract law was altered to conform to the need of the capitalist nation.  
The law worked to assist the expansion of trade and the growth of the nation—
in spite of the likelihood that the stronger party could take advantage of the 
weaker party—so long as actual fraud could not be proven.37  Weaker parties 
were, and continue to be, taken advantage of under the sanction of contract law.38 
II.  THE ORIGIN AND ESSENCE OF TRUST LAW 
In medieval England, land ownership was based on the feudal system, and 
situations arose that required the appointment of one person to look after lands 
owned by another.39  For example, when a knight went off to fight in the 
Crusades, he conveyed management and ownership of his lands to a trusted 
individual during his absence.40  The common oral understanding provided for 
re-conveyance of ownership back to the knight upon his return, or, if he died, 
conveyance of the land to his family.41  If the manager refused to return 
ownership on one of those occasions, common law courts would not recognize 
                                                 
 31. Id. at 233. 
 32. 3 Cow. 445 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824). 
 33. The Court of Appeals of the State of New York, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law. 
cornell.edu/nyctap/court/background.htm (last visited May 11, 2015). 
 34. Horwitz, supra note 11, at 95355. 
 35. See id. at 94142. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 94546. 
 38. Id. (“[N]ineteenth century courts and doctrinal writers . . . were able to elaborate a system 
that allowed judges to pick and choose among those groups in the populations that would be its 
beneficiaries.”). 
 39. THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 50608 (5th 
ed. 1956) (“In the days when feudalism was at its height, the vassal held the land of the lord.”). 
 40. Id. at 57677 (noting that this person was normally a friend or neighboring lord). 
 41. F. W. Maitland, The Origin of Uses, 8 HARV. L. REV. 127, 12930 (1894) (describing 
this type of conveyance as giving one’s “land to another ‘to the use’ of a third”). 
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a claim.42  There was no legal form of action through which courts could grant 
relief.43 
However, it was possible to gain relief in another way.  The disgruntled 
crusader, or his family, could directly petition the king, who would refer the 
matter to his Lord Chancellor.44  The Lord Chancellor could decide the case and 
dispense equity in the king’s name, according to his conscience.45 
In the fifteenth century, the Lord Chancellor, sitting in the equity Court of 
Chancery, would regularly recognize the proved claim.46  The crusader later 
became known as the settlor, his family became known as the beneficiary, and 
the trusted friend who failed to keep his promise became known as the trustee.47  
The transaction was originally termed “adopus” or “to the use of.”48  In time it 
became known as “use,” and ultimately, a “trust.”49 
As aforementioned, the law of contracts developed in the nineteenth century 
in such a way that the stronger party could arrange a deal to allow him to take 
advantage of the other party with impunity.50  The stronger party, within limits, 
could keep the advantages of his bargain.51  The law of private express trusts 
developed in a very different way.  The trustee was considered a “fiduciary,”52 
and the law of trusts vigorously expounded on the need for the fiduciary to do 
equity and put the needs of the beneficiary above his own.53  The law of fiduciary 
duty strictly prohibited the trustee from using his position to take advantage of 
the beneficiaries.54  In the famous words of Judge Benjamin Cardozo: 
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those 
acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. 
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market 
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most 
                                                 
 42. GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 3 
(5th ed. 1973). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. (noting that the chancellors were usually “churchmen” who had a duty to uphold the 
fairness of the law). 
 46. Id. (noting that recognition of these suits in a less formal form went back to the thirteenth 
century). 
 47. Id. § 1. 
 48. PLUCKNETT, supra note 39, at 576, 577. 
 49. Id. (“The word ‘trust’ had a more general meaning, however, and . . . seem[ed] to apply 
to any case where one person was under a moral duty to deal with property for another’s benefit.”). 
 50. See supra notes 3438 and accompanying text. 
 51. Horwitz, supra note 11, at 94652 (discussing how the “will theory of contract” emerged 
in the nineteenth century, supplanting equitable principles of “objective value” and “just price” that 
had previously provided some protection for the weaker party). 
 52. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 42, § 1. 
 53. Id. § 95 (explaining the trustee’s duty of loyalty to the beneficiary). 
 54. Id. 
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sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has 
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. 
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity 
when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 
“disintegrating erosion” of particular exceptions.  Only thus has the 
level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that 
trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any 
judgment of this court.55 
III.  LAW APPLIED AT THE TERMINATION OF A TRUST 
A.  Duties Between Fiduciaries and Beneficiaries May Not Always Be  
Clearly Defined 
Traditionally, trusts were testamentary and supervised by courts.56  By statute, 
a final fiduciary accounting was to be presented to the supervising court and 
copies were to be provided to appropriate beneficiaries.57  Today, more 
commonly than ever, living revocable trusts are employed for estate planning 
purposes in order to avoid costly court supervision.58  When terminating a 
revocable living trust, a corporate fiduciary serving as the trustee has several 
choices: 
1.  Distribute to the appropriate beneficiaries upon first providing them 
with a fiduciary accounting and receiving a receipt and release from 
all of the beneficiaries;59 
2.  File a final fiduciary accounting with an appropriate court in order 
to receive the court’s approval;60 or 
3.  Provide a fiduciary accounting to the appropriate beneficiaries and 
distribute, only asking for a receipt, thereby only relying for protection 
on the running of the applicable statute of limitations.61 
                                                 
 55. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (citation omitted). 
 56. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 42, § 1. 
 57. T.P. Gallanis, The Trustee’s Duty to Inform, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1595, 160002 (2007) 
(describing the different types of information that each type of beneficiary is entitled to receive).  
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 (1959) (noting the trustee’s legal duty to 
provide the beneficiary with any requested information). 
 58. FREDERICK M. SEMBLER & MICHAEL J. FEINFELD, PLANNING AN ESTATE: A 
GUIDEBOOK OF PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES 129 (4th ed. 2014).  See A. James Casner, Estate 
Planning—Avoidance of Probate, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 108, 109 (1960). 
 59. Guidelines for Individual Executors & Trustees, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/real_property_trust_estate/resources/estate_planning/guidelines_for_individual_executors
_trustees.html (last visited May 11, 2015). 
 60. Id. 
 61. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 7-307 (West 2014).  See Kevin D. Millard, The Trustee’s Duty 
to Inform and Report Under the Uniform Trust Code, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 373, 384 
(2005). 
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The advantage of requiring court approval of the fiduciary accounting, or 
requiring receipts and releases, is that doing so might protect the corporate 
fiduciary if the beneficiaries later raise actionable questions.62  The difficulty is 
that neither the court order approving the account nor the received receipt and 
release will prevent the beneficiary from later raising questions where there is a 
claim regarding misleading information or a lack of full disclosure on the final 
accounting.63 
Uncertainty remains as to whether a fiduciary may refuse to make a 
distribution mandated by the governing instrument unless receipts and releases 
are forthcoming.  If the trustee may withhold distribution until he receives 
receipts and releases, is this putting the interests of the fiduciary above the 
interests of the beneficiaries?  Beyond that, the practical disadvantage of 
requiring a receipt and release prior to distribution is that it may cause the 
beneficiaries to become concerned with the idea that they may be giving up 
rights, which may cause them to retain independent counsel.  Protracted 
litigation may follow. 
Distribution without requiring releases minimizes protection for the corporate 
fiduciary but allows the fiduciary to properly and confidently carry out his or her 
fiduciary duties until the final termination of the trust.64  By receiving a prompt 
distribution without a demand for receipts and releases, beneficiaries may not 
feel it necessary to retain independent counsel, and litigation could be avoided.  
Arguably, threatening the beneficiaries with substantial costs by filing the final 
accounting in court (unless receipts and releases are forthcoming) places the 
fiduciary in a position where he will likely seek to protect his own interests over 
the beneficiaries’ interests, thereby raising the issue of a fiduciary duties breach. 
Bargaining for and granting receipts and releases may be seen as contract 
negotiation.  In consideration for the corporate fiduciary giving up its right to 
seek a court review and approval of the final accounting, the beneficiaries grant 
the receipts and releases.  Depending on the circumstances, the application of 
trust law may not condone this common practice,65 and lack of care in how 
                                                 
 62. Julia Zajac & Robert Whitman, Fiduciary Accounting Statutes for the 21st Century, 36 
ACTEC L.J. 443, 44849 (2010) (quoting Millard, supra note 61, at 375).  See Guidelines for 
Individual Executors & Trustees, supra note 59. 
 63. See, e.g., Hastings v. PNC Bank, NA, 54 A.3d 714, 728 (Md. 2012) (finding that a release 
form did not protect the bank-trustee from actions based on fraud or mistake). 
 64. Id. at 73536 (discussing the broader protections that come with releases).  But cf. Millard, 
supra note 61, at 39394 (noting arguments against obtaining permission, or even telling the 
beneficiary about the trust, but disclaiming their importance). 
 65. See Robert Whitman & Kumar Paturi, Improving Mechanisms For Resolving Complaints 
of Powerless Trust Beneficiaries, 16 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 64, 7985 (2002) (providing examples 
of situations in which trustees and beneficiaries seek court oversight). 
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receipts and releases are requested can lead to litigation.66  In the future, new 
trust law may arise to radically change current practice.67 
B.  New Case Law May Change the Law Regarding Trust Administration 
An indication of a trend in new law with regard to trust administration is best 
illustrated by a recent case, Hastings v. PNC Bank.68  In Hastings, beneficiaries 
of a testamentary trust brought an action in Baltimore County Circuit Court 
against the trustee, PNC Bank (PNC).69  The beneficiaries alleged, among other 
things, that the fiduciary “improperly” asked the beneficiaries to execute general 
releases prior to making a final distribution.70  The trustee counterclaimed for 
termination of the trust and filed motions for summary judgment.71  The court 
issued an order assuming jurisdiction of the trust and granted the trustee’s 
motions for summary judgment.72 
1.  The Majority Found No Breach by the Corporate Fiduciary 
The beneficiaries appealed to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, which 
affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision.73  The beneficiaries then sought a writ of 
certiorari, which the Court of Appeals granted.74  By a four-to-three decision, 
the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Special Appeals.75  The majority first 
held that the trustee did not breach “its duty of loyalty in this case merely by 
asking Petitioners . . . to execute a reasonable release and indemnity clause.”76  
The majority also found that the terms of the release and indemnity clause were 
not overly broad.77 
2.  The Dissent Found Breaches by the Corporate Fiduciary 
Three judges dissented strongly.78  The dissenting judges pointed out that 
PNC, the corporate fiduciary, prepared to distribute the trust’s assets to the 
                                                 
 66. See, e.g., Hastings, 54 A.3d at 723. 
 67. Whitman & Paturi, supra note 65, at 91. 
 68. 54 A.3d 714 (Md. 2012). 
 69. Id. at 718. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 718, 734 (noting the three dissenting judges). 
 76. Id. at 726. 
 77. Id. (finding that PNC had not “place[d] impermissibly PNC’s interests before those of 
[the] Petitioners”). 
 78. Id. at 73441 (Adkins, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s approach will 
“encourage more widespread use of such unlawful releases, and enable banks and other trustees to 
cite this case to justify other breaches” by the corporate fiduciary). 
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beneficiaries and sent a letter to them that included, among other things, an 
accounting of the entire trust and a “Waiver, Receipt, Release and 
Indemnification Agreement” (Release).79  The letter explained that each 
beneficiary would receive his or her share of the trust when all of the 
beneficiaries had returned the signed Release.80  In addition, the Release 
provided that “‘the Trust ha[d] terminated; and . . . the parties in interest ha[d] 
requested that PNC distribute the Trust assets . . . without the filing, audit and 
adjudication of an account of PNC’s administration of the Trust with a court of 
competent jurisdiction.’”81  Therefore, upon signing the Release, the 
beneficiaries relinquished their right to formally challenge PNC’s administration 
of the trust funds.  The Release requested, among other things, that prior to 
signing the Release and in lieu of a formal court accounting the beneficiaries: 
“(1) acknowledge that they had consulted with an attorney (or had chosen 
affirmatively not to do so); (2) declare that they had reviewed the books, records, 
and statements of the Trust, and; (3) approve of PNC’s handling and 
administration of the Trust.”82  The Release also contained an indemnity clause 
releasing PNC from liability and requiring the beneficiaries to compensate PNC 
or secure PNC against legal responsibility for any expenses related to the 
termination of the trust; this clause became the subject of litigation.83 
The beneficiaries retained counsel and objected to PNC’s plan for 
distribution.84  The beneficiaries mainly argued against the Release’s 
requirement that the beneficiaries execute the Release before receiving their 
distribution, and they claimed that the Release terms were “far too favorable to 
PNC.”85  In response, PNC argued that signing the Release was not required 
prior to distribution of the trust, and that it could seek a determination from the 
courts to obtain a final accounting and termination of the trust, thus preserving 
the protection it had intended to gain from the Release.86  PNC also argued that 
the opportunity to execute Releases was offered to the beneficiaries as a matter 
of industry practice, “since the majority of beneficiaries prefer to terminate their 
trust via private agreement instead of petitioning a court.”87 
Nonetheless, while still demanding the Release or court approval of the final 
accounting, PNC did release a partial distribution to each of the beneficiaries in 
response to their objections.88  The court considered PNC’s required form of 
                                                 
 79. Id. at 720 (majority opinion). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 72021. 
 82. Id. at 721. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (internal quotation marks ommitted).  
 88. Id. at 72122 (awarding each of the beneficiaries $33,319.97). 
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Release to be roughly the same terminology that the court would have provided 
if the matter had been formally adjudicated and had the court had approved the 
fiduciary accounting.89  The Maryland Court of Appeals found that neither party 
advanced the issue of whether PNC breached its duty to provide all material 
facts to the beneficiaries.90 
3.  The Dissent Found the Fiduciary Breached the Duty to Disclose All 
Material Facts 
Although the majority held that the parties did not brief or argue the issue of 
whether PNC properly communicated all material facts and law to the 
beneficiaries, the dissent felt that this question was before the court and was 
essential to deciding the case.91  The dissent believed that the issue before the 
court—whether a trustee has a right to present a Release providing greater 
protection for PNC than a court order as a precondition to any distribution—
could not be decided unless the issue of proper and full communication was 
considered.92  The dissent posited that PNC had clearly breached its fiduciary 
duty to inform the remaindermen of all material facts.93 
According to the dissent, by refusing to make any distribution unless the 
beneficiaries signed an overly broad Release, PNC forced the matter to a formal 
court accounting.94  That process was far more expensive and time consuming 
than if PNC had presented a Release that only afforded PNC the same 
protections as a court order, or if PNC had simply asked for (rather than 
demanded) a Release and a receipt, or refrained from asking for a receipt or a 
Release.95 
By not making a prompt distribution, the dissent argued, PNC limited the 
ability of the beneficiaries to retain their own counsel and take action to protect 
their rights.96  PNC may have sought to deny the beneficiaries the assets to which 
they were then entitled in order to prevent the beneficiaries from funding formal 
litigation. 
4.  Comparing the Majority and Dissent 
The majority found that requesting the Release was not unlawful, but that a 
trustee has the duty to provide the beneficiaries “with ‘full information and 
                                                 
 89. Id. at 72627 (noting that the Release’s terms “track closely, although not perfectly” the 
wording the court would have used). 
 90. Id. at 724, 734 (noting that the Petitioners had only put forth strictly legal arguments and 
that the Release did not ask the parties to re-evaluate any interest in the relationship). 
 91. Id. at 739 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
 92. Id. at 73940. 
 93. Id. at 740. 
 94. See id. 
 95. Id. at 734 (majority opinion). 
 96. Id. at 73638 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
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complete understanding of the facts.’”97  However, both the majority and dissent 
in Hastings agreed that a trustee is not protected from fraudulent concealment; 
the majority stated: 
It is also worth noting that, no matter the terms of the clause itself, the 
Release Agreement could not protect PNC from liability arising from 
fraud, material mistake or irregularity on PNC’s part . . . . “Because a 
trustee has an affirmative duty to disclose relevant information, a 
matter involving sensitive issues must be revealed in the accounting 
with sufficient clarity to invite attention to the issue if the court order 
is to protect the trustee as a matter of issue preclusion.”  “Of course, a 
trustee who in rendering the account is guilty of fraud or fraudulent 
concealment is not protected.”[] Moreover, “this Court has 
consistently held that fraud can and will invalidate an otherwise-
complete release of liability.”98 
To validate this assertion, the majority relied on the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, 
which says that “[a] particular transaction that would otherwise violate a trustee’s 
duty of loyalty may be authorized by consent properly obtained from or on behalf 
of all of the trust beneficiaries.”99  The dissent even more fully discussed this issue, 
stating that “[t]he Majority brushes off the Trustee’s over-reaching, preferring 
instead to focus on the doctrine that ‘a trustee may engage in self-interested 
course of action so long as the beneficiaries provide valid, informed consent.’”100  The 
dissent believed that the majority saw PNC’s attempt to have the beneficiaries sign 
the Release as “at bottom, [an] arm’s length request to exchange increased 
protection and indemnity for a quicker and less costly distribution of trust 
funds.”101 
The majority comforted itself with the idea that the beneficiaries “retained the 
choice to accede to that request, perhaps negotiate [one] not as broad in its 
protection of PNC, or simply reject it.”102  However, the majority’s analysis of 
consent fails to appropriately incorporate a beneficiary’s inability to properly 
consent to a breach of fiduciary duty without having full and complete information 
relating to the breach.103  The dissent noted this point, and further pointed out 
that “in obtaining the consent, the ‘trustee must not violate other fiduciary duties, 
such as the duty of prudence or impartiality.’”104 
                                                 
 97. Id. at 726 n.10 (majority opinion) (quoting McDaniel v. Hughes, 111 A.2d 204, 210 (Md. 
1955)).  See id. at 734 (noting that PNC’s actions did not violate Maryland law). 
 98. Id. at 72829 (citations omitted). 
 99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c(3) (2007). 
 100. Hastings, 54 A.3d at 739 (Adkins, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion). 
 101. Id. at 728 (majority opinion). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. at 735 (Adkins, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. at 739 n.13 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. g (2007)). 
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The dissent reiterated that in dealings between trustees and beneficiaries, the 
trustee must ensure that the beneficiary has all pertinent information and fully 
understands the implications of the transaction.105  It said: 
This is particularly true when the trustee has superior knowledge of the 
transaction at issue, such as when the trustee is an attorney for the 
beneficiaries and is “experienced in the law.”  In those instances, 
“[t]ransactions for the personal advantage of a trustee . . . are even more 
improper than similar dealings between laymen,” and “[t]o sustain such 
a transaction [sic] the trustee must show that there was a full and 
complete disclosure on his part of all the facts essential to an intelligent 
understanding by the beneficiaries of the subject matter and the 
consequences of the transaction.”106 
From the dissent’s point of view, PNC failed to adequately advise the 
beneficiaries about their rights or describe the potential consequences of signing 
the Release.107  The dissent specifically included a footnote to elucidate that 
the Agreement not only failed to contain full information, but it also 
contained a misrepresentation. The [Release] stated that the 
Beneficiaries—rather than PNC—was the party initiating distribution of 
trust funds without court approval.  Although this may seem like a 
minor misrepresentation, because there are four beneficiaries in this 
case (each receiving the [Release]), this statement has a great potential 
to mislead. After all, each of the four beneficiaries may have gotten the 
impression that the other three beneficiaries had requested distribution of 
trust funds in this manner, when, in fact, they had not.108 
Importantly, the dissent explained that PNC did not “explain to the Beneficiaries 
how the liability protection it sought under the [Release] was more favorable to 
the bank than the protection it would have received upon the court’s approval of 
a final accounting.”109  It said: 
PNC seemingly was impatient with explanations. Although the 
Beneficiaries insisted upon explanation of PNC’s tax and fees 
calculations, those requests seem to have irritated PNC.  In one letter 
to the Beneficiaries, PNC wrote: “The trust document that you request 
is in your possession. . . . Your other questions about fees and taxes are 
adequately addressed in [prior] correspondence to you.  Nevertheless, 
I will attempt to dissect this for you.”110 
The dissent went on to observe the following about PNC’s communications 
with the beneficiaries: 
                                                 
 105. Id. at 739 (quoting McDaniel v. Hughes, 111 A.2d 204, 210 (Md. 1955)). 
 106. Id. at 73940 (quoting McDaniel, 111 A.2d at 21011). 
 107. Id. at 740 (footnote omitted). 
 108. Id. at 740 n.14. 
 109. Id. at 740. 
 110. Id. at 740 n.15. 
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Furthermore, PNC’s demanding tone demonstrates that PNC failed to 
give the Beneficiaries “full and complete information” or explain that 
they were free to reject the [Release’s] sweeping provisions and go to 
court.  In at least two communications with the Beneficiaries, PNC 
stated that—unless the Beneficiaries executed the Agreement—it would 
not be “in a position” to distribute the trust funds.  For instance, in the 
closing line of the letter accompanying the [Release], PNC stated: 
“Upon receipt of the executed Releases from all of the distributees, we 
will be in a position to have the cash disbursed.” . . . Even the Circuit 
Court, which ultimately held that there was no “demand,” agreed that 
“any reasonable person looking at PNC’s correspondence would 
understand that PNC Bank was not going to release funds until all of the 
beneficiaries had signed off on this agreement.”111 
The Hastings dissent relied on the opinion of PNC’s own in-house counsel, 
who had previously written that “it may be ‘time consuming and difficult to get 
beneficiaries to understand’ the process of trust termination.  But, as a trustee, 
PNC owes trustee beneficiaries the duty to provide full and complete 
information.”112  In the Hastings case, PNC narrowly escaped a surcharge for 
allegedly failing in its fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries.113  Thus, subsequent 
cases in this area may spell the end to a demand for a release prior to an estate 
or trust distribution. 
IV.  CONTRACT LAW AND TRUST LAW CLASHES PRIOR TO THE CREATION OF 
THE TRUST 
While contract law and trust law principles often conflict at trust termination, 
a clash can also occur prior to creating the trust.  It is not uncommon, for 
instance, for a corporate fiduciary to offer wealth-planning services without 
charging an affluent customer.114  The bank uses its customers’ information to 
determine which individuals receive an offer.115  While the customer may be 
unaware of the likelihood that the creation of a trust will ultimately be advised, 
the bank personnel likely already recognize this fact.116 
As a preliminary matter prior to the rendering of any services, the customer 
will likely be turned over to the trust department, which may ask the customer 
                                                 
 111. Id. at 740 (footnotes omitted). 
 112. Id. 740 n.18 (citation omitted). 
 113. See id. at 72829 (majority opinion). 
 114. See Lisa Gerstner, Banks Woo Loyal Customers, KIPLINGER (Mar. 2013), http:// 
www.kiplinger.com/article/saving/T005-C000-S002-banks-loyal-customers.html. 
 115. See id. (calling this practice “relationship banking,” in which banks seek out customers to 
keep all assets within the same bank). 
 116. See David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1675, 1712 (2009) (footnote omitted) (noting that many bank patrons start trust accounts after years 
of banking with the same institution and years of convincing from the bank). 
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to enter into an “agreement” with the bank.117  The customer may or may not be 
represented by his or her own attorney.118 
The customer may be asked to execute the bank’s standard form of agreement 
prior to receiving services, or as part of the rendering of services.119  The bank’s 
consideration for the agreement is the bank’s willingness to serve as trustee, or 
the services to be rendered to the customer by the bank free of charge.120  The 
customer in exchange agrees to the terms of the agreement, which may cover 
various matters.121  Some agreements may contain some provisions that favor 
the customer, but for the most part, the provisions of the agreement will favor 
the bank.122 
An example of actual language from this type of agreement follows: 
1. Service as trustee. Whenever [X] National Trust Company 
[(XNTC)] is serving as trustee of any trust [that may be] established 
under this instrument (hereafter, “the Trust”), these provisions, 
numbers 1 through 10, shall be applicable and shall supersede any 
contrary or conflicting provisions. 
2.  Affiliate dealings.  Notwithstanding any rule of law against self-
dealing, divided loyalty, or conflict of interest, [XNTC] is specifically 
authorized to invest all or any portion of the Trust assets in mutual 
funds or other collective investment vehicles affiliated with [the Y] 
Group, Inc. [(an affiliate of XNTC)] and to exercise all rights 
connected with the ownership of such investments. In addition, 
[XNTC] is specifically authorized to engage affiliated entities to 
provide services to the Trust, including, without limitation, brokerage, 
custodial, and agency services. [XNTC] shall not be required to 
reimburse or credit to the Trust the cost of such services, value of any 
benefits, or compensation received by [XNTC] or any of its affiliates 
in connection with such investments or services. 
3.   Administration of nonfinancial assets.  [XNTC] shall act primarily 
as trustee of assets traded on an established securities exchange. 
[XNTC] shall not accept or be responsible for the administration, 
                                                 
 117. See id. at 171112. 
 118. See id. at 1711. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Langbein, supra note 4, at 632 n.31 (“Because trusts originate in gifts, black letter 
law has not required consideration . . . . Even when [trustees are not compensated for their services], 
the trustee’s promise to hold the property for the beneficiary . . . supplies bargained-for 
consideration . . . .”). 
 121. See How to Establish a Relationship with Our Trust Services, VANGUARD (2013), 
http://www.vanguard.com/pdf/eptsb2.pdf (noting that the corporate fiduciary can only assume 
trustee duties after the beneficiary signs the trust agreement, which covers trustee services, 
responsibility for investing assets, relationship with other affiliates, compensation, and various 
other rights and responsibilities). 
 122. See, e.g., id. 
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maintenance, disposition, or sale of real estate, business assets, 
tangible personal property, or any other nonfinancial assets not traded 
on an established securities exchange, unless expressly agreed to by 
[XNTC] in a separate writing. Any Trust asset not accepted by 
[XNTC] shall be administered in a separate share of the Trust by and 
at the sole discretion of the remaining co-trustee(s), or if there is no 
co-trustee then serving, by a trustee who shall be appointed in the 
following order: (i) as set forth in the Trust instrument for filling a 
vacancy in the office of trustee, (ii) as unanimously agreed to by the 
sui juris current eligible income beneficiaries of the Trust, or (iii) as 
set forth in state law.  Any person or organization may be appointed 
as trustee pursuant to this paragraph, notwithstanding any contrary 
provision in the Trust instrument. 
4.  Investment responsibility.  [XNTC] shall have the sole authority 
and responsibility for the investment and reinvestment of the Trust’s 
financial assets and the voting of any proxies and/or execution of any 
corporate actions related to such assets. 
5.   Situs and governing law.  The situs of the Trust shall be the county 
and state in which the [XNTC] office administering the Trust is 
located, and questions relating to the investment or administration of 
Trust assets shall be governed by the laws of that state.  Questions 
relating to the validity of the Trust or to the meaning and effect of its 
dispositive terms shall be governed by the law of the state specified in 
the Trust instrument, or if no state is specified, by the laws of the state 
where the Trust is situated.  [XNTC], without approval of any court, 
shall have the power, but not the duty, exercisable upon notice to the 
current beneficiaries, to change the situs of the Trust at any time and 
from time to time, provided that any such change does not frustrate a 
material purpose of the Trust. 
6.  Accountings.  [XNTC] may satisfy any reporting and accounting 
requirements set forth in the Trust with its customary periodic account 
statements. 
7.  Actions of predecessor trustees.  [XNTC] shall have no duty to 
investigate the acts or omissions of any predecessor trustee.  [XNTC] 
shall not be liable for its decision to investigate or not investigate any 
predecessor trustee’s administration of the Trust or for the acts or 
omissions of any predecessor trustee whether known or unknown to 
[XNTC].  The current investment statements of a predecessor trustee 
shall constitute an accurate accounting of the principal and income of 
the Trust. 
8.   Right to resign.  [XNTC] is authorized, without court approval, to 
resign or transfer the trusteeship to a trust company affiliated with 
[XNTC] or the [Y] Group, Inc., at any time. 
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9.  Nonjudicial agreements.  [XNTC] is authorized, without court 
approval, to enter into binding agreements with the beneficiaries and 
co-trustees with respect to any matter involving the administration of 
the Trust, provided that any such agreement does not frustrate a 
material purpose of the Trust or violate state law. 
10. Compensation.  [XNTC] shall be entitled to receive (a) 
compensation for its services in accordance with its schedule of fees 
in effect from time to time, without reduction for any other fees or 
compensation paid to [XNTC] or its affiliates, and (b) reimbursement 
for expenses properly incurred in the administration of the Trust, 
including, but not limited to, accounting and attorney fees.123 
Although the trust department may later inform the customer that he or she 
must retain an independent attorney for the actual drafting of the trust,124 the 
mandatory inclusion of items in the earlier executed agreement may be done 
without benefit of independent counsel if the settlor does not have her own 
attorney or wish to retain an attorney at that time.125  Even if an independent 
attorney is representing the customer before the agreement is executed, unless 
that attorney is willing to risk the wrath of the corporate fiduciary, little objection 
can be expected because an attorney may be recommended by the corporate 
fiduciary from a group of independent attorneys.126  The attorneys in the 
recommended group may also be on the bank’s approved list of attorneys 
authorized to engage in other work for the bank.127  Furthermore, an attorney 
may choose not to risk being disfavored by the bank for questioning the terms 
of the agreement.  The bank may also make additional suggestions with regard 
to drafting the trust.  For example, the bank may require an exoneration clause 
or a termination fee clause.128  The settlor, or her attorney, may accept these 
clauses without objection.  Under the objective theory of contracts, there is no 
requirement that one must intend or even understand the legal consequences of 
                                                 
 123. Id. 
 124. For example, the drafting of a will or a trust constitutes the practice of law and can only 
be done by an independent attorney.  FAQ’s, GUARANTY BANK & TR. CO., https://www.guaranty 
bankco.com/wealthmanagement/planningresources/frequentlyaskedquestions.aspx (last visited 
May 11, 2015). 
 125. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 126. See Horton, supra note 116, at 1711. 
 127. See Gerald P. Johnston, An Ethical Analysis of Common Estate Planning Practices—Is 
Good Business Bad Ethics?, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 57, 11519 (1984) (outlining the common practice 
and the ethical implications of corporate fiduciaries asking the attorney who scripted the trust to 
fulfill all duties associated with the administration of the trust). 
 128. See Jeffrey M. Sklarz & Robert Whitman, Are Percentage Trust Termination Fees 
Appropriate?, PROB. & PROP., Nov.Dec. 2001, at 4952 (discussing the increasing trend of 
corporate fiduciaries to include the termination-fee clause in a trust). 
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one’s actions when entering a trust agreement.129  It is noteworthy that the “intent 
of the settlor” gained from the trust provisions, seen as one of the most important 
matters in trust law,130 may often express the intentions of the trustee or the 
compliant drafting attorney rather than the actual intentions of the settlor. 
At what point does trust law, requiring adherence to full fiduciary duties by 
the fiduciary, take effect?  Few cases have arisen in which the trust beneficiaries 
question the procedures described above and assert the breach of fiduciary duties 
prior to the actual start of the trust’s operation, but the rise of such litigation in 
this area may be forthcoming. 
V.  THE UTC REQUIRES MANDATORY NOTIFICATIONS TO BENEFICIARIES 
REGARDING THE TRUST 
Notice to beneficiaries may be required at the start or end of trust 
administration or at various stages of administration.131  The UTC has substantial 
mandatory-reporting requirements.132  Unfortunately, perhaps mostly due to 
pressure brought on by corporate fiduciaries, the UTC disclosure provisions 
have been largely rejected by jurisdictions adopting other portions of the 
UTC.133  Such jurisdictions have sharply narrowed the scope of these provisions 
by “elect[ing] to either delete the provisions altogether or modify the[m].”134 
Notably, commentators who do not favor mandatory-disclosure provisions, or 
do not acknowledge that disclosure goes to the essence of beneficiary protection, 
use one or more of the following arguments to support their position: 
1.  The overriding purpose of any uniform act is to achieve uniformity 
among the states135 (implying that bad law backed by strong interests 
capable of gaining support from state legislatures should be the 
standard for promulgating uniform laws). 
                                                 
 129. 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS § 4.26 (3d ed. 2013) (“[T]he objective 
theory of contracts imposes no requirement that one intend or even understand the legal 
consequences of one’s actions, [and therefore] one is not entitled to relief merely because one 
neither read the standard form nor considered the legal consequences of adhering to it.”). 
 130. See Benjamin D. Patterson, Note, The Uniform Trust Code Revives the Historical 
Purposes of Trusts and Reiterates the Importance of the Settlor’s Intent, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
905, 910, 932 (2010) (noting that the UTC codified the common law doctrine that the settlor’s 
intent be the driving force for interpretation of trust provisions). 
 131. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813(a), (c) (amended 2004) 
 132. Id. (providing reporting requirements of trustees to beneficiaries at the beginning, during, 
and at the termination of a trust). 
 133. John Spencer Treu, The Mandatory Disclosure Provisions of the Uniform Trust Code: 
Still Boldly Going Where No Jurisdiction Will Follow—A Practical Tax-Based Solution, 82 MISS. 
L.J. 597, 60001 (2013) (noting that even the jurisdictions that have incorporated the UTC into 
their jurisprudence have largely rejected the provisions mandating communication with 
beneficiaries). 
 134. Id. at 600. 
 135. Id. at 64345. 
726 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:707 
2. Non-disclosure to beneficiaries better serves the settlor’s intent.  
However, these commentators fail to acknowledge the reality that it is 
often a corporate fiduciary, or counsel for the settlor, who inserts 
provisions for non-disclosure into the governing instruments, or 
follows state law sought by corporate fiduciary committees without 
ensuring that the settlor understands the issue.136 
3.  Settlors actually prefer non-disclosure to beneficiaries.137 
4. Disclosure (one of the basic requirements for a valid trust) is 
unneeded “reform.”138 
5.  The underlying common law of trusts should be disregarded.139 
6.   Disclosure requirements found in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
may be disregarded.140 
7.  The use of a trust protector or some other questionable substitute 
might pass muster.141 
Interestingly, one critic of disclosure to trust beneficiaries noted that, in spite 
of state legislation omitting the UTC provision for disclosure, state courts may 
still require disclosure by relying on other UTC sections or the common law.142 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
At both the creation and termination of the trust, and periodically throughout 
trust administration, contract law principles favoring the corporate fiduciary may 
be applied.143  Current law generally deems these practices acceptable and 
enforceable.  In practice, no customer or beneficiary may claim the right to strike 
contract clauses, despite those provisions clearly favoring the corporate 
fiduciary. 
Under contract law, whether the bank’s customer actually reads and 
understands the solicited agreement will not matter—the provisions of the 
agreement will be held to constitute the actual intent of the customer.144  
Nonetheless, depending on the circumstances, a court may be creative in order 
                                                 
 136. See id. at 62426. 
 137. See id. at 63032. 
 138. Id. at 644. 
 139. See id. at 626. 
 140. Cf. David M. English, Uniform Trust Code (2002): Significant Provisions and Policy 
Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 148 (2002) (noting that courts often adopt rules rather than a practice 
described in a Restatement). 
 141. Treu, supra note 133, at 63640 (noting the growing body of commentary suggesting that 
trust protectors may effectively carry out the settlor’s intent without mandatory disclosure 
requirements). 
 142. Id. at 607 (noting two jurisdictions that relied on other UTC sections to ensure mandatory 
disclosure to beneficiaries). 
 143. See supra notes 11316, 12829 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra notes 7576, 129 (providing relevant case law and describing the objective 
theory of contracts used to uphold the signing of the document rather than actual intent). 
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to arrive at a fair result.  Future litigation will determine whether contract law or 
trust law principles prevail.  Because of the expense of litigation, the 
appropriateness of bank conduct as a fiduciary or an expected fiduciary may 
often go untested. 
Is it reasonable to expect that future outcomes of litigation will clarify the law, 
and that courts’ findings of breaches of fiduciary duties may change present 
practices?  Even where pressure from banks causes state legislatures to enact 
statutes blatantly favoring corporate fiduciaries, should there be obvious 
injustice done to beneficiaries, an equity court may decide to go against the 
corporate fiduciary and, in scrutinizing conduct, expanding the scope of 
fiduciary duty, and calculating damages, send a message to the corporate 
fiduciary community.  
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